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TAKE TWO TABLETS AND DO NOT CALL FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNTIL OUR HEADS 
CLEAR:  THE SUPREME COURT PREPARES TO 
DEMOLISH THE “WALL OF SEPARATION” 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 
Terence J. Lau∗ 
William A. Wines** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[] . . . . ” 1 
 
“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state.”2 
 
“At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences 
of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may 
count themselves fortunate:  Our regard for constitutional boundaries 
has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious 
exercise to flourish. . . .  Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between 
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question:  Why would we 
                                                 
∗  Terence J. Lau is Associate Professor in the School of Business Administration, 
University of Dayton.  He holds a J.D. (magna cum laude) from Syracuse University College 
of Law.  Prior to joining the University of Dayton, he served as Director for ASEAN 
Governmental Affairs for Ford ASEAN Operations in Bangkok, Thailand, and as in-house 
counsel for Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Michigan.  Professor Lau served as a 
Supreme Court Fellow in 2006-2007 at the Supreme Court of the United States, assigned to 
the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice. 
**  William Arthur Wines is Associate Professor, Department of Business, College of 
Professional Studies at Missouri Western University, St. Joseph, MO.  Professor Wines 
holds a B.S./B.A. with distinction from Northwestern University and a J.D. from the 
University of Michigan and is admitted to practice in Minnesota and Washington State.  In 
1999, Wines was the John J. Aram Professor of Business Ethics at Gonzaga University, 
Spokane, Washington. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in STEPHEN MANSFIELD, TEN 
TORTURED WORDS:  HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO PROTECT RELIGION IN 
AMERICA . . . AND WHAT’S HAPPENED SINCE 37 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served others so 
poorly?” 3 
 
“We have built no temple but the Capitol.  We consult no common 
oracle but the Constitution.”4 
 
“Preserve me, O God:  for in thee do I put my trust.”5 
 
Pleasant Grove, Utah’s “City of Trees[,]”6 is a nice place to raise a 
family.  Established by Mormon pioneers in 1850, it is now a prosperous 
upper-middle class community, 93% white, with a median household 
income of $70,000 and median home price of $247,900.7  Minor 
inconveniences are easily overcome in Pleasant Grove.  When town 
founders felt the original name of the settlement, Battle Creek, was too 
contentious, they readily agreed to the much more appealing “Pleasant 
Grove.”8  When the town stopped growing strawberries, no one saw any 
reason to stop the annual summer celebration of “Strawberry Days[,]” 
which was, after all, “the longest continuing community celebration in 
Utah to date.”9  When the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated a 
monument of the Ten Commandments in 1971 to Pleasant Grove as part 
of a broad campaign to place thousands of monuments throughout the 
country, the city readily displayed the monument in a public park, 
Pioneer Park.10  Decades later, however, when a little-known religious 
organization calling itself the Summum asked to display a monument of 
its own religious precepts (called the “Seven Aphorisms”) alongside the 
Ten Commandments, the City of Pleasant Grove politely declined.11  But 
this time, the minor inconvenience will not be resolved as easily or 
economically as a name change or the decision to continue a summer 
strawberry festival in spite of the dearth of local strawberry farms.  The 
                                                 
3 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
4 The Architect of the Capitol, Quotations and Inscriptions in the Capitol Complex, 
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/cc_quotations.cfm. (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (quoting Rufus 
Choate). 
5  Id. (quoting Psalm 16:1). 
6 Pleasant Grove:  Utah’s City of Trees, http://www.plgrove.org (last visited Oct. 17, 
2008). 
7 Id. (follow “Business & Development” hyperlink; then follow “Economic Profile” 
hyperlink). 
8 Id. (follow “Unique to Pleasant Grove” hyperlink; then follow “Pleasant Grove 
History” hyperlink). 
9 Id. 
10 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (Feb. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
11 Id. at 5. 
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Summum filed suit in a federal district court in 2005, seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief, claiming that a city that accepts one group’s 
religious message for public display must equally accept another group’s 
religious message.12 
The District Court ruled in favor of Pleasant Grove.13  That decision 
was later overruled by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held 
that the City’s placement policies were subject to strict scrutiny because 
Pioneer Park is a traditional public forum.14  The Summum prevailed 
again by a razor-sharp (6-6) margin upon a motion for rehearing en banc, 
prompting unusual dissents and opinions from the Justices.15  The 
Summum’s success has caused conservatives endless hand-wringing at 
the prospect of our nation’s public parks facing the Hobbesian choice of 
either removing existing privately donated monuments or allowing all 
privately donated monuments to be displayed.  Conservative legal 
foundations have gleefully assumed the fight,16 sensing an opportunity 
to make headway in their frustrated battle to reintroduce displays of 
piety into public governmental life.  Casting their bait, the foundations 
chummed the waters by dangling the horrific prospect of a Statue of 
Tyranny being erected next to the Statue of Liberty and the Alice in 
Wonderland statue in Central Park being dismantled.17  The United 
States Supreme Court, newly constituted after the longest period in its 
history (since 182318) without a change in membership,19 faithfully bit, 
and granted certiorari20 in spite of the fact that the Summum litigation 
had not progressed beyond denial of the preliminary injunction request 
in the United States District Court for Utah.21 
In this Article, we examine the issues that bring First Amendment 
jurisprudence to this fascinating and troubling case.  For the most part, 
our examination proceeds chronologically.  Part II of this Article 
                                                 
12 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc, 499 F.3d 
1170 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008). 
13 Id. at 1048. 
14 Summum, 499 F.3d at 1174. 
15 Id. at 1170. 
16 See generally Jon Meacham, Golly, Madison, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 2008, at 63 (quoting 
STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH (2008)).  This is ironic, as “‘separation of church and 
state would not exist if not for the efforts of eighteenth-century evangelicals.’”  Id. 
17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 13, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 
(Nov. 20 2008). 
18 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr/ 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
19 Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer Than Most, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 
43. 
20 Summum, 128 S. Ct. at 1737. 
21 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 10, at 17. 
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examines the historical basis of America’s “religious heritage.”  We 
examine the role of the Western frontier as a safety valve for free-
thinkers and others from governmental intervention in religion, and the 
ongoing tension between the Adams and Jefferson views on how pious 
government should be.  In Part III, we explore historic judicial treatment 
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment and the twenty-five year 
degradation of the wall of separation between church and state, 
including the successful efforts by religious conservatives to cast the 
debate in terms of the Free Speech clause rather than the Establishment 
or Free Exercise Clauses.  We also trace the short-lived and curious life of 
the “expressive association” doctrine in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence as a possible predictor of the limits of the Free Speech 
argument Summum advances.  In Part IV, we examine the Ten 
Commandments and the inherent discrimination present in modern-day 
attempts to advance a particular version of the Ten Commandments as 
secular.  We also examine the Court’s twin 2005 decisions on the public 
display of the Ten Commandments, and we look at the manner in which 
Van Orden v. Perry paved the road for Summum.  In Part V, we lay out the 
facts of the Summum litigation and examine the questions both raised 
and begged by the Summum case.  Finally, in Part VI, by drawing upon 
Rousseau’s civic religion, we suggest alternative routes for the Court to 
pursue in similar cases in the future, including a resolution of the vexing 
questions posed by the Summum and the monument in Pleasant Grove.  
We argue that in light of America’s increasing religious diversity22 and 
our rising religious intolerance,23 the Supreme Court should set aside 
                                                 
22 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (120th ed. 2000).  
In 1980, Protestant was the religious preference of 61% of Americans; 28% were Catholic; 
2% were Jewish; 2% reported themselves as other; and 7% had no religious preference.  Id.  
In 1999, those numbers had shifted to 55% Protestant; 28% Catholic (back up from 25% in 
1990); 2% Jewish; 6% other; and 8% had no religious preference.  Id.  Only 43% of 
Americans were weekly church/synagogue attendees.  Id.  In twenty years, those 
Americans who described themselves as “[o]ther” or having no religious preference 
jumped from 9% to 16%, an increase of 55.5 percent.  Id.  Since 1991, the annual net 
immigration rate in the United States has been running between 3.1% and 3.9%.  Id. at 8. 
23 See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, F.B.I., HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2005).  In 2005, law 
enforcement agencies reported that 15.7% of reported hate crimes were motivated by 
religious bias.  Id.  Of those, 68.5% were anti-Jewish; 11.1% were anti-Islamic; 7.8% were 
anti-other (unspecified) religions; 4.6% were anti-Catholic; 4.4% were anti-Protestant; 3.2% 
were anti-multiple religions; and 0.4% were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism.  Id.  The U.S. 
Census lumped Muslims in with “[o]ther”—Buddhist, Hindu, etc.  See U.S. CENSUS, supra 
note 23, at 62.  Yet, the percentage of anti-Islamic hate crimes exceeded the total percentage 
of other in the 2000 Census.  Id.  A reporter for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights issued a report in 1998 that found religious intolerance in the United 
States and specifically “an islamophobia reflecting both racial and religious intolerance.”  
ABDELFATTAH AMOR, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING:  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 
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conservative ideology in order to better serve the long-term interests of 
an increasingly diverse American polity. 
II.  AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS HERITAGE 
Before the ink on the First Amendment was dry, the country began 
its earnest debate about the meaning of religion in public life.  The 
debate has taken on a new urgency in modern times, with conservatives 
claiming the country was founded as a Christian nation,24 and liberals 
arguing otherwise.25  In this Section, we trace this debate as it played out 
between founding fathers Thomas Jefferson and John Adams and its 
effect on the expanding Western frontier.  We narrow the discussion by 
concentrating on how the debate has affected the controversy 
surrounding Ten Commandment displays around the country. 
A. Jefferson’s Wall of Separation v. Adams’s Public Piety 
Two prominent founding fathers had very different ideas about how 
to reconcile the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment.26  Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts can be traced to his 1779 Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom.27  His views on church-state 
relations were influenced by his own personal views—although he 
believed in Jesus and called himself a Christian, he believed that “power-
hungry monarchs and corrupt ‘priests’ had despoiled the original, 
pristine teachings of Jesus.”28  Jefferson thought that true religious 
freedom required both free exercise and the disestablishment of religion 
by the state.29  “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” Jefferson 
wrote, and consequently, 
                                                                                                             
(1998) http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/3129ccf9f586f716802 
56739003494e4?Opendocument.  We note that these figures are before the anti-Muslim 
feelings spiked in the U.S. after the events of September 11, 2001. 
24 See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS:  HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT 
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2002). 
25 See, e.g., CHRIS RODDA, LIARS FOR JESUS:  THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S ALTERNATIVE VERSION 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY (2006). 
26 See generally John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion, 32 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 499 (2004) [hereinafter Freedom of Public Religion]; John Witte, Jr., Publick Religion:  
Adams v. Jefferson, FIRST THINGS:  A MONTHLY J. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, 29–34 (Mar. 2004) 
[hereinafter Publick Religion]; John Witte, Jr., ‘A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of 
Religion’:  John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213 (1999) 
[hereinafter John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment]. 
27 Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 501–04. 
28 DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 82 (2006). 
29 Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 501. 
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no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor 
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in 
his body or goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on account 
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall 
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in 
no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil 
capacities.30 
During his presidency, Thomas Jefferson coined the term “wall of 
separation” in his famous letter of January 1, 1802 to the Danbury 
Baptists.31  Jefferson’s viewpoint seems to take the broader reading of the 
First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion”—a reading that includes in its 
ambit a prohibition against recognizing the mere existence of religion as 
opposed to a narrower reading that Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of a religion, which would seem to provide 
no such protection.32  Indeed, Jefferson explicitly endorsed the notion 
that religion is a strictly private matter “which lies solely between man 
and his God, and that man owes account to none other for his faith or his 
worship.”33 
John Adams, the second president and Jefferson’s chief political 
rival, presented an international treaty to the country that included the 
famous words, “‘[T]he government of the United States of America is 
not, in any sense, founded on the Christian Religion . . . [.]’”34  A Puritan 
at heart, he did not even visit his first Catholic church until the 
Continental Congress, when he, George Washington and others visited 
St. Mary’s Church in Philadelphia.35  “Both repelled and moved,” he 
                                                 
30 Id. (citing A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON: 
CONTAINING HIS MAJOR WRITINGS, PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED, EXCEPT HIS LETTERS 946, 
947 (Saul K. Padover ed. 1943)). 
31 Letter to Danbury Baptists, supra note 2. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  For further discussion of this distinction, see George L. 
Alexander, Separation of Church and State, http://www.friendsjournal.org/separation-
church-and-state (last visited Oct, 17, 2008). 
33 Letter to Danbury Baptists, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
34 See Ed Buckner, Does the 1796–97 Treaty with Tripoli Matter to Church/State Separation?, 
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/buckner_tripoli.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).  
The language of the treaty was meant to persuade Tripoli (now Libya) that the United 
States would not engage in a religious war with Muslims.  Id.  The treaty language was 
ratified by the Senate and there is no record of a public outcry in any major city or city 
newspaper.  Id. 
35 Holmes, supra note 28, at 2. 
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later described the service as “‘aw[e]ful and affecting.’”36  In contrast to 
Jefferson, however, Adams did not support the idea of a wall of 
separation (if one stream of modern scholarship is correct).37 
Professor John Witte, Jr.38 wrote the following summary of Adams’s 
views: 
The notion that a state could remain neutral and purged 
of any public religion was, for Adams, equally a 
philosophical fiction.  Absent a commonly adopted set 
of values and beliefs, politicians would invariably hold 
out their private convictions as public ones.  It was thus 
essential for each community to define and defend the 
basics of a public religion.  In Adams’s view, its creed 
was honesty, diligence, devotion, obedience, virtue, and 
love of God, neighbor, and self.  Its icons were the Bible, 
the bells of liberty, the memorials of patriots, and the 
Constitution.  Its clergy were public-spirited ministers 
and religiously committed politicians.  Its liturgy was 
the public proclamation of oaths, prayers, songs, and 
election and Thanksgiving Day sermons.  Its policy was 
state appointment of chaplains for the legislature, the 
military, and prisons; state sanctions against blasphemy, 
sacrilege, and iconoclasm; state administration of tithe 
collections, test oaths, and clerical appointments; and 
state sponsorship of religious societies, schools, and 
charities.  “Statesmen may plan and speculate for 
liberty,” Adams wrote in defense of his views, “but it is 
religion and morality alone which can establish the 
principles upon which freedom can securely stand.”  A 
“Publick Religion” sets the “foundation[s], not only of 
republicanism and of all free government, but of social 
felicity under all governments and in all the 
combinations of human society.”39 
                                                 
36 Id. at 3. 
37 See generally Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26; Publick Religion, supra note 26; 
John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, supra note 26. 
38 Witte is the Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Director of Law and Religion Program, 
and Director of Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion at Emory University, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
39 Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 504 (citing THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 
(Charles Francis Adams, ed.1850–56) (footnote omitted)). 
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Witte posited these two models of religious liberty, justifying his 
emphasis on the two by citing the prominence of their proponents and 
the importance of their respective states, Virginia and Massachusetts.40  
However, Professor Witte judiciously noted the common ground and 
beliefs shared by Jefferson and Adams:  both men were consciously 
engaged in a new experiment in religious liberty; both started with the 
credo of the American Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson 
drafted41 and Adams signed;42 and both insisted on providing 
constitutional protection for every peaceable, private religious belief and 
the holder thereof in their era.43 
However, the contrasts are as significant as the shared ground:  
whereas Jefferson proposed a robust freedom of expression, Adams 
approved only a moderate or “‘tempered’” religious freedom; whereas 
Jefferson pushed for a complete separation of church and state, Adams 
wanted only a division of religious and political offices; and whereas 
Jefferson sought the complete disestablishment of all religions, Adams 
campaigned for a modest, “‘mild’” establishment of one public religion 
as a balance or check on individual religious freedom.44 
Based upon an impressive array of information and scholarship, 
Professor Witte declared that “[f]or the first century and a half of the 
republic, it was Adams’s style of argument about religious 
liberty . . . that dominated the nation . . . .”45  By the time of America’s 
fourth President, Madison, the culture of religious freedom had firmly 
taken root.  Madison would go on to become “a kind of Adam Smith of 
church and state:  he believed that the marketplace, if left to its own 
devices without government interference, would produce stronger 
religious belief, not weaker.”46  He argued “that only liberty of 
conscience could guarantee civil and political liberty.”47  In an interesting 
antecedent to today’s debate, Madison’s “belief that citizens should 
voluntarily support religion led him to oppose the appointment of 
                                                 
40 Id. at 505. 
41 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. WINES, ETHICS, LAW, AND BUSINESS 28–29 (2006).  Jefferson wrote 
the bulk of the document by himself for a committee composed of John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin, Jefferson, Robert R. Livingston, and Roger Sherman.  Id.  Only Franklin and 
Adams made minor changes to Jefferson’s draft, which he worked on and completed in 
two weeks.  Id. at 29.  See also Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 505.  Professor 
Witte, in a minor oversight, wrote that “they [Adams and Jefferson] drafted[]” the 
Declaration of Independence.  Id. 
42 Wines, supra note 41, at 378. 
43 Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 505. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 505, 506–10. 
46 Meacham, supra note 16, at 63. 
47 Holmes, supra note 28, at 93. 
2009] “Wall of Separation” Between Church and State 603 
chaplains for Congress and for the army and navy.”48  In arguing against 
assessments for funding religion, Madison observed:   
Who does not see that the same authority which can 
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, 
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of 
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?  that [sic] the 
same authority which can force a citizen to contribute 
three pence only of his property for the support of any 
one establishment, may force him to conform to any 
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?49 
It turns out that “[Madison] was right:  once the federal government 
declined to establish a church and the states moved to disestablish 
(Massachusetts was the last, in 1833), religious belief grew.”50 
B. After 150 Years, a Wall of Separation Goes Up in Public Places 
Horace Greeley is attributed with the famous aphorism:  “‘Go West, 
young man, and grow up with the country.’”51  Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, states were free to use assimilation and 
accommodation to clamp down on dissenters,52 who responded by using 
the “escape . . . valve” of moving west.53  “The right and duty to emigrate 
was a basic assumption of the early American experiment in religious 
liberty[]”54—at least, John Adams’s style.  Frederick Jackson Turner, the 
historian, famously observed in 1893 that the American frontier had 
                                                 
48 Id. at 94. 
49 MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS BY JAMES MADISON, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) (follow “Founding Era” 
hyperlink; then follow “James Madison” hyperlink; then follow “Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” hyperlink). 
50 Meacham, supra note 16, at 63. 
51 David H. Fenimore, Horace Greeley, (1996), http://wolfweb.unr.edu/homepage/ 
fenimore/greeley.html. 
52 Freedom of Public Religion, supra note 26, at 506–09. 
53 Id. at 508.  Professor Witte observed:   
One of the saving assumptions of this system was the presence of 
the frontier, and the right to emigrate thereto.  Religious minorities 
who could not abide by a community’s religious restrictions or accept 
its religious patronage were not expected to stay long . . .   They 
moved—sometimes at gunpoint—to establish their own communities 
on the frontier[.] 
Id. 
54 Id. 
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disappeared.55  Curiously, Jackson, a University of Wisconsin Professor, 
was right in the sense that there no longer was a sharp demarcation on 
the U.S. Census map indicating a “frontier” in terms of population 
density per square mile;56 however, in a larger sense, the American 
frontier had not closed.57  For our purposes, the “frontier”—in the sense 
of an open and virtually unsettled wilderness where one could go to 
escape forced participation in a community with an established public 
religion—was on the verge of disappearing; but 1893 has no talismanic 
significance.58 
As a consequence of the closing of the traditional geographic safety 
valve for free thinkers, heretics, and iconoclasts, the Supreme Court 
needed to intervene to protect the Free Speech and religious freedoms of 
minorities, particularly unpopular minorities.  The seeds for such a 
process can be found in the Holmes dissent (from the Espionage Act 
convictions of the petitioners in the Abrams case), which resulted in the 
“clear and imminent danger” standard for free speech.59  As late as 1940, 
the Supreme Court upheld requirements that public school children 
salute the flag.60  Undeterred, Jehovah’s Witnesses brought another case 
to the Court just three years later.  In that case, the Court reversed its 
course and by a 6-3 margin expressly overruled its 1940 decision, 
reasoning that the First Amendment protects individuals from state 
compulsion to salute the flag.61  As we discuss below, however, the role 
of the Court in protecting unpopular religious minorities has sharply 
reversed since the 1940s. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
In spite of the desire to escape religious tyranny, America’s early 
history demonstrates a fair amount of religious intolerance.  Nine 
colonies had official religions,62 and in some, such as Maryland, denying 
the existence of Jesus Christ was punishable by death.63  In other 
                                                 
55 See FMC Program Segments 1990–1930:  Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, 
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/ segments/ progseg1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).  
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST:  THE UNBROKEN PAST 
OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987). 
58 See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 451 (2007).  In 1893, for example, there were 
only 44 stars on the U.S. flag.  Wyoming had become the 44th state in 1890.  Id.  New 
Mexico and Arizona became the 47th and 48th states, respectively, in 1912.  Id. 
59 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919). 
60 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
61 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
62 Holmes, supra note 28, at 34. 
63 Alexander, supra note 32, at 8. 
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colonies, only professed Christians could run for public office.64  The 
Declaration of Independence is replete with references to God, a 
necessity “to mobilize the citizenry in a time of war.”65  In the 
Constitution itself, however, there is not a single mention of God; but 
there is a prohibition on any religious test as a qualification for office 
under the United States66 and, after 1791, the First Amendment provided 
for the free exercise of religion and required the separation of church and 
state.67   Containing the avant-garde ideas of Roger Williams and his 
followers, the Rhode Island Charter of 1663 was the first broad 
declaration of religious freedom in the colonial settlements.68  From 
Charles II, the Rhode Island and Providence plantations solicited and 
received the guarantee that “everye person may . . . freelye and fullye 
have and enjoye his . . . owne judgments and consciences, in matters of 
religious concernments[.]”69  Williams might have considered the charter 
provision an opening wedge for other rights.  At any rate, he did not 
limit his vision to religious freedom, but rather expounded the radical 
doctrine calling for broad liberties that would permit the widest latitude 
for personal freedom. 
In a similar vein, the “fundamental laws of West New Jersey” were 
granted in 1676 “by the proprietors on the specific condition that they 
were ‘to be the foundation of the government . . . not to be altered by the 
Legislative authority’ under any circumstances.”70  In these laws, the 
West New Jersey proprietors agreed to a provision assuring broad 
religious freedom.71  No freeholder, or inhabitant of the province, could 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.72   
Two colonial charters issued in the 1680s followed the West New 
Jersey pattern.73  The New Hampshire Charter of 1680, though not 
mentioning other personal rights, did grant liberty of conscience to all 
Protestants.74  Pennsylvania was the scene of a more forthright 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
67 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
68 ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776–1791 17 (1955). 
69 Id. at 17 (quoting BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1596–97 (1878)). 
70 Id. at 18–19 (quoting FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2548–51 (1909)). 
71 Id. at 19. 
72 Id. (quoting FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2548–51 (1909)). 
73 Id. at 20. 
74 Id. (quoting BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1277 (1878)). 
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experiment in freedom, for there William Penn, a former West New 
Jersey proprietor, applied the ideas that had worked so well in New 
Jersey.75  Also “termed a ‘charter of liberties,’” the Pennsylvania Frame of 
Government of 1683 granted extensive personal rights.76  Freemen were 
authorized to elect a General Assembly to make laws and were 
permitted to plead their own cases in court before a jury of twelve men.77  
By 1770, Pennsylvania would be filled with many small religious groups, 
many from Germany, all believing “that they had restored practices of 
apostolic Christianity that mainstream Christianity had wrongly 
abandoned[.]”78  It should be noted, however, that religious toleration in 
Pennsylvania was limited to those “who confess[ed] and 
acknowledge[d] the one Almighty and eternal God, to be the Creator, 
Upholder, and Ruler of the world.”79  Despite its restrictive character, 
this and similar religious provisions of other charters represented a 
notable break from the narrow conception of tolerance prevailing 
throughout most of Europe.80   
A “‘Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges[,]’” passed by the New 
York General Assembly in 1683, guaranteed substantive personal rights 
to freeholders.81  The charter assured accused persons the right to a trial 
by a jury of peers with “‘reasonable [c]hallenges.’”82  Bail was allowed in 
all cases except those involving treason or felony.83  The quartering of 
troops in private dwellings during peacetime was forbidden.84  Another 
provision forbade trial and punishment of civilians under martial law.85  
Free exercise of faith was guaranteed to Christians as long as they did 
not disturb the peace.86   
The Duke of York, now turned king, refused to approve this 
legislation.87  Undaunted, New York citizens continued to press for the 
personal protection already enjoyed by other colonies.88  Then in 1691, 
the provincial Legislative Council approved a second declaration of 
rights which included liberty of conscience for all (except for professed 
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78 Holmes, supra note 28, at 5. 
79 Id. 
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81 Rutland, supra note 68, at 21. 
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Roman Catholics) and repeated the personal rights guarantees of the 
enactment of 1683.89  With James II removed by the revolution, this bill, 
although it lacked permanency, appears to have become law.90   
When a young America adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791, the First 
Amendment prohibited the establishment of state-sponsored religion.  
At the time, it was only intended “‘to apply to the federal government, 
not the local governments that regulate schools, local courthouses and 
town squares.’”91  (We note as an aside that the originalist jurisprudence 
adopted by Justices Scalia,92 Thomas,93 and Alito,94 if adopted, would not 
stop cities or states from establishing government-sponsored religion.)  
In 1947, however, a different United States Supreme Court incorporated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby applying its prohibitions to state governments as 
well as the federal government.95  It is also significant that the Court’s 
1947 decision laid the foundation for modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence by reviewing the history of the clause and adopting 
Thomas Jefferson’s and James Madison’s “wall of separation” 
language.96 
The Supreme Court’s endorsement of a wall of separation picked up 
momentum, and seemed to peak in the 1960s under the Warren Court.  
In 1963, for example, the Court invalidated South Carolina’s application 
of its Unemployment Compensation Act because the Act authorized the 
denial of benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for refusing 
to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath.97  In 1965, the Court broadly 
                                                 
89 Id. (quoting THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 113 (1894–96)). 
90 Id. 
91 Meacham, supra note 16, at 63 (quoting STEVEN WALDMAN, FOUNDING FAITH (2008)). 
92 Justice Scalia has said that he believes “‘[Y]ou give the text the meaning it had when it 
was adopted.’”  Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/ 
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93 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), should be overturned because the 
First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect speech in public schools). 
94 See Jeffrey Rosen, Alito vs. Roberts, Word by Word, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at D1 
(noting Justice Samuel Alito’s remark that “‘[t]he principles don’t change.  The Constitution 
itself doesn’t change.  But the factual situations change.’”). 
95 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
96 Id. at 18 (writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black declared:  “The First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable.”).  For a history of the evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine and for 
criticisms of the Everson case, see Adam M. Conrad, Hanging the Ten Commandments on the 
Wall Separating Church and State:  Toward a New Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 38 GA. L. 
REV. 1329, 1337–41 (2004). 
97 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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construed the “belief” required to qualify for the status of a 
conscientious objector to encompass any sincere and meaningful belief in 
“a Supreme Being” that would occupy a parallel place in the life of the 
possessor as that of the orthodox belief in God.98  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Douglas agreed with the majority’s interpretation and 
stressed that any interpretation that embraced one religious faith and not 
another would violate the Free Exercise Clause.99  He further argued that 
such an interpretation would “result in a denial of equal protection by 
preferring some religions to others—an invidious discrimination that 
would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”100  
In 1968, the Warren Court went so far as to carve out an exception to the 
longstanding rule that taxpayers lack standing to challenge the use of 
taxpayer funds if the challenger alleges a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.101 
This jurisprudence has been under attack in recent years,102 and 
lower courts appear to have responded in kind.  Decisions addressing 
faith-based initiatives and school voucher programs provide the clearest 
examples of the recent deterioration of the wall of separation between 
church and state.  In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court in 
2002 reversed a Sixth Circuit decision103 and upheld a voucher system 
that favored the placement of students in sectarian schools put in place 
by the State of Ohio.104  Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the state’s amended Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program, which allows students to attend, at no charge, private sectarian 
and nonsectarian schools.105   
The so-called “[f]aith-[b]ased [i]nitiatives[]”106 spearheaded by 
President George W. Bush spawned numerous federal and state cases.  
                                                 
98 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965). 
99 Id. at 188–89 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
100 Id. at 188. 
101 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
102 See generally Terence Lau, Judicial Independence:  A Call for Reform, (forthcoming in NEV. 
L.J.).  Judicial interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, in keeping with 
the constitutional scheme for courts and Marbury, have raised the ire of conservatives.  Id.  
This anger has translated into endorsement by so-called men of faith for acts of violence 
against judges and multiple legislative attempts to remove these cases from the jurisdiction 
of the courts.  Id. 
103 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
104 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
105 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).   
106 See, e.g., Carol J. De Vita & Sarah Wilson, Faith-Based Initiatives:  Sacred Deeds and 
Secular Dollars, (July 1, 2001) http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310351&renderfor 
print=1.  We do not comment on the effectiveness of the faith-based initiatives beyond 
referring to the studies done on them by the Urban Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit 
think tank established to study the effectiveness of government programs.  Id.  One 
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For example, on January 25, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia held that Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) was constitutional on the ground 
that it was a proper exercise of Congress’s spending power.107  On 
January 7, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin upheld a grant of funds by the Department of Corrections to 
Faith Works, Milwaukee, Inc., a faith-based, long-term alcohol and drug 
treatment program, but struck down a similar grant from the 
Department of Workforce Development.108   
The highest-profile challenge to the faith-based initiatives, however, 
resulted in a procedural attack on standing rather than a substantive 
challenge based on the Establishment Clause.  Relying on the Flast 
exception that permits taxpayer standing in cases challenging the 
unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds in violation of the Establishment 
Clause,109 the Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) challenged 
President Bush’s White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives.110  Created by Executive Order,111 the Office of Faith Based 
and Community Initiatives provided financial support to, among other 
groups, MentorKids USA, an organization with a stated mission “‘[t]o 
exalt the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God, the Savior of the World[,]” 
hired only Christians as mentors, and required mentors to provide 
monthly reports to assess whether their mentee was progressing in their 
relationship with God.112 During oral argument, the Solicitor General 
Paul Clement sought to distinguish Flast by arguing that taxpayer 
standing is only appropriate when Congress, pursuant to its taxing and 
spending power, passes a statute that enables money to be disbursed 
outside of the government in violation of the Establishment Clause.113  
                                                                                                             
problem that an early Urban Institute study highlighted, beyond that of funneling taxpayer 
dollars to organizations that are exempt from the fair hiring requirements of Title VII of the 
1965 Civil Rights Act, was that inner city, poor churches lack the staff and financial 
resources to prepare the grant requests necessary to participate in faith-based initiatives 
with the unfortunate result in the D.C. area that much of the money went to suburban 
mega-churches whose programs did not reach the very poor and needy in the central city.  
Id. 
107 Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (2006), remanded to 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. Va. 
2006). 
108 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 
2002). 
109 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
110 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Dennis Grace v. Freedom From Religion Found., 
Inc., No. 06-157 (Sept. 9, 2004). 
111 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002). 
112 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 110, at 44a–45a. 
113 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. 
Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157). 
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An incredulous Justice Breyer asked if standing would exist where 
“Congress passes a statute and says in every city, town, and hamlet, we 
are going to have a minister, a Government minister, a Government 
church . . . dedicated to the proposition that this particular sect is the true 
sect[.]”114  General Clement replied that even in that case, there would 
not be taxpayer standing under Flast.115   
In a 5-4 decision, with a plurality opinion by Justice Alito joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the Court accepted General 
Clement’s arguments, holding that because the White House Office of 
Faith-Based Initiatives was established by an action of the executive 
branch pursuant to “general Executive Branch appropriations[,]” FFRF 
lacked standing.116  The plurality’s refusal to overrule Flast117 led to a 
separate concurrence, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice 
Thomas, complaining:  “We had an opportunity today to erase this blot 
on our jurisprudence, but instead have simply smudged it.”118  Thus, it 
would appear, Justice Stewart’s contention that “‘every taxpayer can 
claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a 
religious institution[]’” no longer rings true in 2008.119  
The modern Supreme Court’s erosion of the wall of separation took 
an interesting turn in 2000 when, in a 5-4 decision, it held that Boy Scouts 
of America (“BSA”) had a First Amendment right to exclude gay 
scoutmasters.120  The case involved the termination of an openly gay man 
as an assistant troop leader solely on the basis of his sexual orientation.121  
The scout leader had prevailed at every step of the litigation up through 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, arguing that under New Jersey Human 
Rights Law,122 BSA engaged in illegal discrimination.123  Brushing aside 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, a majority of 
the United States Supreme Court held that the right to associate under 
the First Amendment must also include the right not to associate.124  In 
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that 
requiring BSA to retain the scoutmaster would significantly burden the 
                                                 
114 Id. at 17–18. 
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116 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007). 
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organization’s right to teach boys “‘that homosexual conduct is not 
morally straight[.]’”125   
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
observed that, because BSA did not endorse any position on sexual 
matters, requiring BSA to retain the scoutmaster (1) did not impose any 
serious burden on BSA’s shared goals; (2) did not compel BSA to endorse 
a particular message; and (3) abridged no right of BSA under the 
Constitution.126  Moreover, Justice Stevens pointed out that BSA claimed 
to be non-sectarian.127  Indeed, many diverse religious organizations 
sponsor local Boy Scout Troops, and “[b]ecause a number of religious 
groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or wrong and reject 
discrimination against homosexuals, it is exceedingly difficult to believe 
that [BSA] nonetheless adopts a single particular religious or moral 
philosophy when it comes to sexual orientation.”128 
The result in this case is that by the slimmest margin, the Court 
permitted BSA to endorse a religious message of some of its sponsoring 
organizations over the conflicting message of other sponsoring 
organizations and justified it all by relying on the First Amendment.  
This sleight of hand provides a prelude to the majority decision in Van 
Orden v. Perry,129 which also involved the promotion of one group’s 
religious interpretations over equally valid but different interpretations. 
In a case described as a “predictable fallout from the Boy Scouts’ 
victory before the [United States] Supreme Court[,]” the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California invalidated the City 
of San Diego’s long-term lease of prized public parklands to the Boy 
Scouts on the grounds that such a lease violated the Establishment 
Clause of the Federal Constitution and the No Aid and No Preferences 
Clauses of the California Constitution.130  The case remains on appeal 
before the Ninth Circuit, which in turn has asked the California Supreme 
Court to clarify the meaning of the relevant portions of the California 
Constitution.131 
IV.  RELIGIOUS PUBLIC DISPLAYS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The debate over, and resulting experiment in, religious freedom, that 
has made “‘[t]he United States . . . among the most religious and most 
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129 See infra Part IV.C. 
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tolerant of nations,’”132 is in sharp focus in the Summum case.  Religious 
conservatives, angry and hurt over a perceived deviation from the 
originalist meaning of the Establishment Clause, have fought for years to 
re-introduce piety into public life.  In the 1950s, at the height of the 
country’s fear of the spread of atheism attendant with Communist rule, 
President Eisenhower began a new Washington tradition of prayer 
breakfasts.133  Congress responded by establishing a prayer room in the 
Capitol.134  In 1954, the words “‘under God’” were added to the Pledge 
of Allegiance.135  In 1955, Congress added the words “‘In God We Trust’” 
on all paper money.136  In 1956, Congress replaced “‘E Pluribus Unum’” 
with “‘In God We Trust’” as the country’s national motto.137  Despite the 
fall of Communism in the 1980s, the fight over public displays of piety 
continues to this day at both the state level (witness Ohio’s 2006 statute 
requiring school districts to display any donation of a plaque with either 
“‘In God We Trust’” or “‘With God, All Things Are Possible’” in a 
classroom, auditorium, or cafeteria)138 and federal level (such as efforts 
in the House of Representatives to recognize the importance of 
Christmas and the Christian faith)139. 
Discontent with the lack of public displays of piety, evangelical 
Christians have forced the issue of the government’s endorsement of 
religion squarely back into the public eye.  In recent years, we have 
witnessed attempts by school boards to outlaw the teaching of evolution 
in public schools,140 the introduction of a creationist-based philosophy 
called “Intelligent Design” into school-science curricula,141 public 
displays of piety on vehicle license plates such as South Carolina’s “‘I 
Believe’” license plates,142 righteous indignation every December at the 
“War on Christmas,”143 public harangues of atheists,144 and even the 
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mass relocation of evangelicals to South Carolina in hopes of seceding 
from the United States and creating a new Biblical republic.145  The First 
Amendment paradox appears as alive today as it has ever been in our 
nation’s history, as the prohibition against government validation of 
religiosity squares off against an intolerant strain of the Christian 
majority that raises conversion to the level of a fundamental tenet, a 
pillar of the faith.   
The main act in this drama, however, remains the Ten 
Commandments.  Woefully misunderstood and often framed 
erroneously, it remains the flashpoint between those who seek the 
aggrandizement of religious public displays and those who oppose such 
expansion.  The battle over the Ten Commandments has cost at least one 
Alabama State Supreme Court justice his job,146 and the proper role for 
the Ten Commandments in public life continues to give impetus for 
much legislative action.147  In this Section, we examine the Ten 
Commandments in some detail, and conclude that they are inherently 
religious precepts, in spite of efforts to cast them as nonsectarian.  Armed 
with that conclusion, we examine the Supreme Court’s Ten 
Commandments jurisprudence, and argue that unless the Court 
overturns its 2005 Perry decision, the outcome in Summum will almost 
certainly result in the city prevailing and a startling rise in government-
endorsed public displays of piety. 
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A. The Ten Commandments 
In 1956, Cecil B. DeMille was searching for a way to promote his 
Paramount Pictures production, The Ten Commandments.148  The nearly 
four-hour movie, featuring the parting of the Red Sea in technicolor, was 
“by far the largest and most expensive” DeMille production.149  In an 
“ingenious” public relations campaign, he established a partnership with 
the Fraternal Order of Eagles (“FOE”), commissioned the construction of 
several thousand Ten Commandments monuments, and donated them 
around the country.150  The FOE was no stranger to this form of 
donation, making national news in 1952 for donating an “illuminated 
print” of the Ten Commandments to President Truman (himself an 
Eagle), who commented that the U.S. “[g]overnment was patterned to 
some extent on the laws given to Moses on Mount Sinai.”151  The 
donations took place during gala events attended by the movie’s stars—
Yul Brynner attended the Milwaukee party, and Charlton Heston 
attended a party in North Dakota.152  The public displays prompted one 
New Yorker, a stenographer at the New York Life Insurance Company 
living at home with her mother, to pay for subway car advertisements to 
publicize the Ten Commandments from her life savings, earning her the 
International Civic Award from the FOE.153  When the Order presented 
Rev. Billy Graham with a civic service award in 1957, he “praised the 
[O]rder for its program of placing framed copies of the Ten 
Commandments in schools and public buildings.”154 
Ironically, while the FOE was interested in using the Ten 
Commandments to spread morality and virtue, DeMille was more 
interested in selling sex on the silver screen.  He wrote: 
“I am sometimes accused[] . . . of gingering up the Bible 
with large and lavish infusions of sex and violence.  I 
can only wonder if my accusers have ever read certain 
parts of the Bible.  If they have, they must have read 
them through that stained-glass telescope which 
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centuries of tradition and form have put between us and 
the men and women of flesh and blood who lived and 
wrote the Bible.”155 
The movie was still playing in theaters five years after its release and 
spawned a whole generation of Bible-based Hollywood blockbusters, 
including King of Kings, Barabbas, David and Goliath, and Ben Hur.156  The 
Ten Commandments movie would become the fifth highest grossing 
movie in history, behind Gone With the Wind, Star Wars, The Sound of 
Music, and E.T.157 
President Truman may have been stretching the truth when he 
compared U.S. laws to the Ten Commandments.  In fact, Americans are 
not bound by law to follow seven of the Ten Commandments.  By its 
very nature, the Ten Commandments is an aggregation of ideals rather 
than law.  Close examination of the substance of the Ten 
Commandments reveals that some of those ideals are in direct conflict 
with modern American values.   
The First Commandment, for example, reflects a central tenet of 
Christianity:  to bring “the world[] to adopt a single, uniform system of 
belief and conduct.  For some believers the commitment to spread the 
‘Word’ is intrinsic to their religious practice.”158  One need read no 
further to see the evident tension between the First Commandment and 
the First Amendment, which proclaims the right of Americans to do 
exactly what the Commandment prohibits. 
The Ten Commandments have been criticized by some liberal 
theologians as being grossly unfair.  The Second Commandment, for 
example, commands that future generations shall be held responsible for 
the sins of an ancestor, a notion that we would find immoral and 
unfair.159   
                                                 
155 Bosley Crowther, The Good Book Is a Great Script, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1961, at SM10. 
156 Id. 
157 All Time Box Office Adjusted for Ticket Price Inflation, http://www.boxofficemojo. 
com/alltime/adjusted.htm?adjust_yr=0&p=.htm. 
158 Alexander, supra note 32, at 9. 
159 See Dan Bilefsky, In Feuds, Isolation Engulfs Families, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at A6.  
The ancient Albanian “Kanun[]” code of blood feud, which states that “‘blood must be paid 
with blood,’” is still alive in some parts of Albania today, resulting in over 1,000 children 
deprived of schooling because they have been locked indoors for fear of reprisal for their 
fathers’ crimes.  Id. 
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B. The Protestant Ten Commandments Is Inherently Religious 
Examination of various religious texts further reveals the sectarian 
nature of the Ten Commandments.  As commentator Allan Sloan 
recently wrote: 
 You may think that the Supreme Court ruled last 
week that the state of Texas could continue to display a 
Ten Commandments monolith on its capitol grounds in 
Austin.  But you’d be wrong.  Look at the 
monolith . . . and you’ll notice that it doesn’t contain 10 
commandments.  It has 11.  And if you count “I am the 
Lord thy God” as a commandment, which Jews do but 
Christians don’t, the Supreme Court has approved a 
Twelve Commandments monolith, rather than the 
traditional Decalogue. . . . 
 . . . [T]he text is a compromise drawn up by Jewish 
and Christian clergy to respect everyone’s beliefs.  So 
rather than bearing Ten Commandments that are the 
Word of God, the monolith bears 11 or 12 
commandments that are the Word of a Committee.160 
This is not mere semantics nor is it hairsplitting.161  The so-called Ten 
Commandments are a vital part of Judeo-Christian heritage and 
culture.162  As Sloan further observed in his commentary, “it’s one thing 
to be in favor of ethics and morality in public life, [but] it’s a whole 
different thing to think—as I suspect most Americans do—that there is 
one single Decalogue.”163  Sloan may have been too tactful or his editors 
too careful not to offend.  The difference is not subtle:  the former is a 
valid belief or political opinion; but the latter is simple ignorance. 
As Sloan also points out, there are two versions of the Ten 
Commandments contained in the Bible and they are different.164  The 
version in Exodus, chapter 20, directs observance of the Sabbath because 
                                                 
160 Allan Sloan, The Commandment Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Jul 11, 2005, at 58. 
161 Id. See also David C. Pollack, Note, Writing on the Wall of Separation:  Understanding the 
Public Posting of Religious Duties and Sectarian Versions of Sacred Texts as an Establishment 
Clause Violation in Ten Commandment Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1366–78 (2004) 
(providing a thorough discussion of the various versions of the Ten Commandments 
amongst religious groups and remarking that the Fraternal Order of Eagles and Cecil B. 
DeMille erected as many as 2000 graphite monuments during their campaign containing 
“at least three distinct versions of the Commandments”). 
162 Sloan, supra note 160. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. (citing Exodus 20:2–14 and Deuteronomy 5:6–18). 
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after the Lord created the world He rested on the seventh day.165  In the 
second version, contained in Deuteronomy, chapter 5, the Lord decrees 
observance of the Sabbath because he brought the Israelites out of 
bondage in Egypt.166 
Moreover, observant Jews did not consistently apply the 
Commandments in their dealings with Gentiles.  One scholar of Jewish 
theology in the last century of the Second Temple has described this area 
as very complex and abstruse.167  There are, at least, three different 
numbering systems for the Commandments; the Jews have one, the 
Roman Catholics and Lutherans have a second; and Protestants 
(generally) have a third.168  Finally, theologians cannot agree on how 
these Commandments should be translated; and the differences in the 
translations are not insignificant.169  As one author emphasized:   
“The division of the commandments themselves is not 
certain.  There are altogether thirteen sentences in the 
accepted Jewish versions (seventeen in the Christian) but 
we cannot conclude from the text itself what comprises 
the first commandment, what the second, and so forth.  
For while there are thirteen mitzvot [commandments] to 
be found in the text, their allocation to ten 
commandments can be done in various ways.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that there are different traditions in 
this respect.”170   
For example, the Sixth Commandment171 or the Fifth Commandment 
(depending on the religious group in question)172 is translated either 
“‘You shall not murder[,]’”173 “Thou shalt not kill[,]”174 “‘You shall not 
kill[,]’”175 or “You shall not murder.”176  Even the religious groups that 
                                                 
165 Exodus 20:10–11. 
166 Deuteronomy 5:12–15. 
167 See E. P. SANDERS, JUDAISM:  PRACTICE AND BELIEF, 63 B.C.E.—67 C.E. (1992). 
168 Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1485–94 (2005). 
169 Id. at 1493–99. 
170 Id. at 1488 (quoting THE TORAH:  A MODERN COMMENTARY 534 (W. Gunther Plaut, ed., 
1981) (1962)). 
171 Id. at 1489 (citing the numbering in the Jewish and Protestant versions of the Ten 
Commandments). 
172 Id. at 1490–91 (citing the numbering in the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Lutheran 
versions of the Ten Commandments). 
173 Id. at 1489 (citing the Jewish version). 
174 Id. (citing the Protestant version). 
175 Id. at 1490 (citing the Roman Catholic version). 
176 Id. at 1491 (citing the Lutheran version). 
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may agree upon the Commandments numbering (for instance, Lutherans 
and Roman Catholics call this the Fifth Commandment) differ on 
whether the correct translation is “‘not kill’” or “not murder.”177  The 
meaning of this Commandment, of course, is also subject to manifold 
interpretations, especially as it relates to wartime killing, execution of 
prisoners, and abortion.178   
Any claims that a display of the Ten Commandments is secular or 
nonsectarian are thus demonstrably false.  Even the choice of numbering 
and translation on any such display is an endorsement of one religion 
over another.  If State Y erects a granite slab with the Hebrew version of 
the so-called Ten Commandments, that action favors Judaism over 
Christianity, Buddhism, and atheism or non-religion.  If State Y does not 
pay for the granite slab, it does not alter the result. 
The controversy over public displays of the Ten Commandments, 
then, boils down to this:  is the First Amendment violated when a statue 
of the Protestant version of the Ten Commandments (an inherently 
religious text central to the belief of several major world religions), 
commissioned by a partnership of a Hollywood movie studio and a civic 
organization for the duplicitous purpose of promoting a movie and 
promoting morality among America’s youth, is displayed to the public 
in space owned by the government?  In 2005, the Supreme Court 
confronted this question squarely, and handed down a decision that was 
inconclusive at best, and at worst, all but rolled out a red carpet 
invitation to the sort of litigation presented in Summum.   
C. Twin Ten Commandments Cases of 2005 
Almost twenty-five years after its last decision on the Ten 
Commandments,179 the Supreme Court spoke again in the cases of 
McCreary County v. ACLU180 and Van Orden v. Perry,181 both decisions 
issued on June 27, 2005, just one month and two days before the 
                                                 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Historical Abortion Beliefs of the Christian Church, http://www. 
religioustolerance.org/abo_hist.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
179 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a Kentucky law 
requiring the posting of Ten Commandments in public schools violated the First 
Amendment).  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens concurred in the 
order reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.  Id.  Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Blackmun dissented and would have granted certiorari in order to give the 
cases plenary consideration.  Id. at 43.  Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented from 
summary reversal.  Id.  Justice Rehnquist would have upheld the trial court relying on the 
legislature’s statement of secular purpose was supported by the facts of the case.  Id. 
180 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
181 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
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Summum filed suit in Utah.  These decisions did nothing to clarify 
where the line should be drawn regarding the appropriateness of 
displaying the Ten Commandments.  In McCreary’s 5-4 decision, the 
Court held that two Kentucky counties had to take down copies of the 
Ten Commandments posted in courthouses; but in Van Orden, another 5-
4 decision, the Court held that Texas could leave a 6-foot-high 
“monolith” inscribed with the Ten Commandments on its Capitol 
grounds in Austin.  The difference?  Ostensibly, Texas had a secular 
purpose, and the two Kentucky counties did not. 
In McCreary, two Kentucky counties (McCreary and Pulaski) 
displayed in their respective courthouses large, gold-framed copies of an 
abridged text of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments, 
including a citation to the Book of Exodus.182  The placement in 
McCreary County was done at the direction of the county legislative 
body.  In Pulaski County, the Commandments were hung in a ceremony 
presided over by the county Judge-Executive, accompanied by his 
church’s pastor.183  The Judge-Executive “called them ‘good rules to live 
by’”; and his pastor said they were “‘a creed of ethics[.]’”184   
The following is the version of the commandments posted by both 
counties:   
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images. 
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. 
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. 
Honor thy father and thy mother. 
Thou shalt not kill. 
Thou shalt not commit adultery. 
Thou shalt not steal. 
Thou shalt not bear false witness. 
Thou shalt not covet. 
Exodus 20:3-17.185 
When we turn to Exodus 20:3-17, we find a much longer and more 
involved version of the commandments, starting with “I am the Lord, 
thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the 
house of bondage.”  This version seems to have been addressed to the 
                                                 
182 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 852. 
185 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  The Court noted a finding 
of the District Court that determined the displays in each county were functionally 
identical.  Id. at n.2. 
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Israelites; moreover, it settled the question of the Sabbath by saying it is 
on the seventh day (not Sunday but Saturday, starting at sundown on 
Friday evening until sundown on Saturday evening, for people who 
lived before clocks and standardized time zones).  Also, note the choice 
of the version of the Ten Commandments is from Exodus instead of the 
somewhat different version found in Deuteronomy.186  
In November 1999, the ACLU of Kentucky sued the counties seeking 
an injunction against maintaining the displays because they violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.187  Before the district 
court acted, the legislative bodies of both counties authorized an 
expanded display and resolution with recitations that the Ten 
Commandments were “‘the precedent legal code upon which the civil 
and criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded[.]’”188   
After argument, the district court entered a preliminary injunction 
on May 5, 2000, directing that the displays be removed 
“IMMEDIATELY[]”189 and enjoining county officials from erecting 
similar displays.190  The counties responded by posting a third display 
consisting of the Commandments and eight other framed documents of 
equal size.191  Each document included a statement about its historical 
and legal significance.192  The ACLU of Kentucky moved to supplement 
the preliminary injunction to enjoin the new displays.  As requested, the 
trial court supplemented the original injunction, and a divided panel of 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed.193   
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the 
preliminary injunction.  In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, she noted:  
“Given the history of this particular display of the Ten Commandments, 
the Court correctly finds an Establishment Clause violation.  The 
                                                 
186 See Deuteronomy 5:6–21.  For discussion of the differences between the Exodus and 
Deuteronomy versions of the Decalogue, see supra text accompanying notes 160–78.  For 
discussion of the different traditions for counting the Commandments, see supra text 
accompanying notes 168–77.  Based on the above discussion, the numbering and 
translation used by McCreary and Pulaski counties seems to have embraced the Protestant 
rather than the Roman Catholic or Jewish versions.  The presence of “Thou” and “thy” 
suggest that it is a heavily edited, vastly reduced version taken in small pieces from the 
King James version. 
187 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852. 
188 Id. at 853. 
189 ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
190 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 855. 
191 Id.  The other documents were copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star-Spangled Banner, the Mayflower 
Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of 
Lady Justice.  Id. at 856. 
192 Id. at 857. 
193 ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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purpose behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an 
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.”194  
She continued, “[While] [i]t is true that many Americans find the 
Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. . . . we do not 
count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.”195   
In Van Orden, the Court held by a 5-4 margin that a 6-foot high 
monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments standing on the 
grounds of the Texas State Capitol in Austin did not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.196  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for a plurality that included Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas; Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment by separate 
opinion; and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Souter dissented 
and filed three separate dissenting opinions.197 
In a passage with which we have some difficulty, the late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist198 described the Supreme Court case law on the 
Establishment Clause as “Januslike, point[ing] in two directions[.]”199  He 
continued with the observation, “One face looks toward the strong role 
played by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s 
history. . . .  The other face looks toward the principle that governmental 
intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious 
freedom.”200 
In the next passage, the Chief Justice managed to magically morph 
the neutrality of non-establishment into a principle of not “disabling the 
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage[]”; he 
stated it in the singular, as if all Americans share one religious 
heritage:201   
 This case, like all Establishment Clause challenges, 
presents us with the difficulty of respecting both faces.  
Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these 
                                                 
194 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
195 Id. at 884. 
196 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
197 Id. at 681. 
198 See Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Dies, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at 
A1 (discussing in detail the events that gave rise to the death of the late Chief Justice).  
Chief Justice William Rehnquist died on the evening of Saturday, September 3, 2005, 
during the Senate hearings on President Bush’s nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be an 
Associate Justice of the Court.  Id.  Mr. Rehnquist had been receiving treatment for thyroid 
cancer.  Id. 
199 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683 (plurality opinion). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 684.  That Americans do not share one religious heritage seems patently obvious.  
See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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institutions must not press religious observances upon 
their citizens.  One face looks to the past in 
acknowledgment of our Nation’s heritage, while the 
other looks to the present in demanding a separation 
between church and state.  Reconciling these two faces 
requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to 
maintain a division between church and state nor evince 
a hostility to religion by disabling the government from 
in some ways recognizing our religious heritage[.]202 
For this sweeping re-interpretation of the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, the Chief Justice cited the little-noted 1952 
decision of Zorach v. Clauson.203   
There is substantial support for the position that government cannot 
be hostile to any one religion or accommodate any one religion.  
However, the last phrase, “by disabling the government from in some 
ways recognizing our religious heritage,” deserves more analysis.  A 
critical reading of the Zorach decision lends no substantial support for 
the proposition advanced by the Chief Justice that the First Amendment 
does not prohibit the government from recognizing our religious 
heritage.204 
The Chief Justice acknowledged that various places in the nation’s 
Capitol held replicas of Moses with the Ten Commandments including 
three places in the Supreme Court building and grounds.205  The Chief 
also observed that “simply having religious content or promoting a 
message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.”206  He noted that the placement of the monument 
on the Texas State Capitol Grounds was a fairly passive use of them.207  
He concluded, “We cannot say that Texas’ display of this monument 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”208   
The most important vote in the Van Orden v. Perry decision, 
however, belonged to Justice Breyer, a Clinton appointee, who was the 
decisive swing vote and wrote only for himself—reminiscent of Justice 
                                                 
202 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84 (plurality opinion). 
203 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).  
204 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion).  The Zorach decision, a 6-3 result with 
Mr. Justice William O. Douglas writing for the majority, held that New York City’s decision 
to release students to attend religious training on school days upon written request of the 
parents did not violate the Establishment clause.  Zorach, 343 U.S. at 306. 
205 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion). 
206 Id. at 690. 
207 Id. at 692.  
208 Id. 
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Powell’s timeless and prescient position in Bakke v. Regents of University 
of California in 1978.209  Justice Breyer opined that when one decides a 
case under the First Amendment’s religion clauses one cannot apply a 
mechanical test but “must refer . . . to the basic purposes of those 
Clauses.”210  Those basic purposes, he wrote, are threefold:  (1) to 
“‘assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for 
all[]’”; (2) to “avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes 
social conflict[]”; and (3) to maintain “‘separation of church and 
state.’”211   
In Van Orden, Justice Breyer saw a “borderline case[]”212 that would 
permit  “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”213  
After reviewing the physical setting and donative history of the display, 
Justice Breyer wrote, “For these reasons, I believe that the Texas 
display—serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose, not 
primarily ‘advanc[ing]’ or ‘inhibit[ing] religion,’ and not creating an 
‘excessive government entanglement with religion’—might satisfy this 
Court’s more formal Establishment Clause tests.”214   
Next, Justice Breyer portended that a contrary conclusion might light 
the fires of hostility toward religion and “encourage disputes concerning 
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments” and 
similar themes from public buildings.215  He further acknowledged the 
danger of a slippery slope but said the case presented “only [a] 
shadow[]” of the real dangers the First Amendment was designed to 
prevent.216  He stated flatly that he disagreed with the plurality’s analysis 
but that—for reasons all his own—he agreed with the result.217 
D. Where the Individual Justices Stand 
The seven Van Orden opinions and three McCreary opinions reveal 
profound differences amongst the justices as to the proper role of 
religion in American public life and as to the proper application of the 
two religion clauses of the First Amendment.  Let us review the 
spectrum. 
                                                 
209 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
210 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 700. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 703. 
215 Id. at 704. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
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1. Justice Scalia 
Justice Scalia is on one extreme of the Court’s varied positions on 
religious freedom.  During oral argument in Van Orden, he stated that 
the Ten Commandments are “a symbol of the fact that government 
comes—derives its authority from God.  And that is, it seems to me, an 
appropriate symbol to be on State grounds.”218  He argued that the 
Constitution does not mandate governmental neutrality between religion 
and non-religion.219  Justice Scalia indicated that he would also repeal the 
third prong of the Lemon test.220  According to the Justice “even an 
exclusive purpose to foster” advancement of religion does not necessarily 
make a display unconstitutional so long as people are not significantly 
taxed or forced to observe the posting.221  In his concurring opinion in 
Van Orden, Justice Scalia posited that a state should be able to favor 
religion generally, engage in public prayer, or “venerat[e] the Ten 
Commandments[]” without violating the Establishment Clause.222  The 
Justice has criticized the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence by 
accusing his colleagues of relegating religion to “some purely personal 
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in 
the privacy of one’s room.”223  Though an avowed originalist, Justice 
Scalia ignores the fact that some of the Framers of the Constitution 
believed religion to be a purely private affair.224  Justice Scalia, therefore, 
would appear to permit any public endorsement of religion as long as it 
stops short of compelled worship under penalty of law.225  On the rare 
occasion that Justice Scalia may concede that government may not favor 
one particular religion over another, his concurrence in McCreary 
suggests that this generosity only extends toward monotheistic 
religions,226 seemingly contradicting the text of the Constitution itself.227   
                                                 
218 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500). 
219 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
220 Id. at 900. 
221 Id. at 902. 
222 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
223 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
224 See supra Part II.A (noting Jefferson’s belief that religion should be a strictly private 
and personal matter). 
225 Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
226 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
227 For a critique of Justice Scalia’s bias towards monotheism, see Michael C. Dorf, Does 
the Constitution Permit Government To Favor Religion over Nonreligion? Justice Scalia Says Yes, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20080604.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
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2. Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas’s position mirrors that of Justice Scalia’s.  But Justice 
Thomas’s willingness to overrule 65 years of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence by un-incorporating the Establishment Clause as it applies 
to the states merited mention by Justice Stevens, the ideological 
antithesis of Thomas and Scalia, as “at least[]” facing the “problem head 
on.”228 
Justice Thomas believes that, in order “to abandon the inconsistent 
guideposts”229 that the Supreme Court has established under the 
Establishment Clause and “return to the original meaning of the 
Clause[,]”230 the Supreme Court should reverse its course by holding that 
the Establishment Clause is not incorporated against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.231  In the alternative, absent this complete 
reversal, Justice Thomas would restrict the Establishment Clause to its 
meaning in 1791, i.e., prohibiting state-mandated religious observance or 
use of taxes in support of ministers of a denomination endorsed by the 
state.232  Justice Thomas has not publicly discussed how to correct the 
inaccuracies that may arise when the Justices fail as historians.233   
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
Writing for the plurality in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued for more tolerance of government sponsored speech in the area 
of religion primarily because of “the strong role played by religion and 
religious traditions throughout our Nation’s history.”234  The Chief 
Justice’s opinion in Van Orden has been reviewed at length above.235  The 
most troubling portions of his opinion are his reading of the 
Establishment Clause as not reaching passive religious speech by 
government and his finding that the Establishment Clause does not 
disable the government from “in some [unspecified] ways recognizing 
our religious heritage.”236   
The concept of a singular religious heritage is fundamentally flawed.  
A cursory surveillance of any U.S. military cemetery would reveal the 
                                                 
228 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 731 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
229 Id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
230 Id. at 693. 
231 Id. at 694. 
232 Id. 
233 See David Savage, Supreme Court Finds History Is a Matter of Opinions, L.A. TIMES, July 
13, 2008. 
234 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683 (plurality opinion). 
235 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the dimensions of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion). 
236 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion). 
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presence of stone crosses and Stars of David237—evidence of, at a 
minimum, two distinct religious heritages.  And yet, in what ways has the 
American government recognized a singular religious heritage?  “In God 
We Trust” was added to American coins at the suggestion of a 
clergyman during the Union’s darkest days of the Civil War.238  Later, 
“Under God” was added to the Pledge of Allegiance239 in response to 
national hysteria generated by the “Red Scare” of the McCarthy era.240  
The purpose, of course, had little or nothing to do with a religious 
heritage241 and everything to do with “distinguishing” Americans from 
the “Godless Commies.”  Should we now leverage this disgraceful 
period242 of our history to justify the infusion of more “God-talk” into 
constitutionally-protected public discourse simply to please a vocal 
minority who embraces evangelical Christianity?   
4. Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy was an active questioner during oral arguments in 
Van Orden.  He suggested that requiring a disclaimer with any display of 
the Ten Commandants stating that the display is secular is “hypocritical” 
because it “ask[s] religious people to surrender their beliefs and . . . is not 
[a form of] accommodation.”243  He voted with Rehnquist, Scalia and 
Thomas on both cases but did not write an opinion in either.  As for the 
McCreary decision, Justice Kennedy disassociated himself from Part I of 
Justice Scalia’s dissent.244  Part I of Scalia’s dissent245 borders on 
                                                 
237 See, e.g., Burial and Memorial Benefits:  Veterans Benefits & Services, http://www. 
cem.va.gov/.  
238 See Coin Symbols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1907, at 8.  On Feb. 12, 1873, Congress granted 
the Secretary of the Treasury the approval to inscribe “In God We Trust” on U.S. coins.  See 
Coin Symbols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1907, at 8.  Id. 
239 See President Hails Revised Pledge:  He Endorses Congress’ Action in Inserting Words 
‘Under God’ in Allegiance Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1954, at 31.  A joint Congressional 
resolution passed on June 14, 1954 added the words “under God” to The Pledge of 
Allegiance.  Id. 
240 Oxnam Cites Fight of Church on Reds:  Says It Has Done More Than All Congress 
Committees – Other Bishops Back Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 1953, at 10.  Protestant church 
bishops spoke out against the godless philosophy of Communists infiltrating America.  Id. 
241 See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 9,6871 (2004) for an excellent analysis of the error in the argument that “In 
God We Trust” has lost religious meaning.  One basic underlying problem with the 
statement, as Professor Shiffrin so elegantly points out, is that “any English speaker knows 
that ‘under God’ and ‘In God We Trust’ carry theological meaning.”  Id. at 69.  In short, it is 
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preferentialism when he advocates that the First Amendment does not 
mandate governmental neutrality on religion246 and argues that historic 
practices justify “disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned 
deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”247  Parts II and 
III, joined by Justice Kennedy, reject the extension of the scope (as Justice 
Scalia sees it) of the principle that Government cannot favor religious 
practices over non-religious practices and argues for a different result 
based upon the Establishment Clause principles used by the majority.248  
Justice Kennedy’s voting pattern, coupled with his previously authored 
opinions in this area249 suggest that he may be the most moderate, or the 
most undecided, of the block of four Justices permitting governmental 
speech in the area of religion.   
5. Justice Breyer 
Justice Breyer takes a moderate position in the two Ten 
Commandments cases.  He wrote separately, and provided the pivotal 
vote to resolve Van Orden holding that the Texas display was 
constitutional; Justice Breyer also provided the fifth vote in McCreary 
concurring with Justice Souter’s majority opinion holding that the 
Kentucky display was unconstitutional.  Justice Breyer expressed 
exasperation with the conservative direction of the Court following a 
critical affirmative action decision when he remarked in open court, “‘It 
is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much,’” an 
unusual observation not included in his written dissent.250  Because he 
did not write his own opinion in McCreary, it is not possible to fully 
detail his views; however, one can surmise that his doctrinal views may 
not be substantially different than that of Justices O’Connor and Stevens.  
In fact, he agreed with Justice O’Connor’s statement of principles in 
McCreary but not how she applied them in Van Orden.251  It appears he is 
in the middle—even if he leans left toward the governmental-neutrality 
gang of four.  Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden, detailed 
above,252 suggests (maybe in our mildly reductionist manner) that he 
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would not disturb passive displays that have been up for decades—
thereby emphasizing his desire to avoid divisiveness. 
6. Justice Ginsburg 
Justice Ginsburg is one of two justices who did not write a single 
opinion in the Ten Commandments cases (Kennedy being the other one).  
Justice Ginsburg, a Clinton appointee, was General Counsel to the ACLU 
from 1973–1980 when she was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit.253  Because Justice Ginsburg voted with the block of four 
in favor of governmental neutrality in the area of religious expression, 
we will (somewhat arbitrarily) place Justice Ginsburg here in the 
spectrum.   
7. Justice Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter 
Unless one parses out sentences and weighs subtleties, it appears 
there is not much difference between these three Justices—Stevens, 
O’Connor, and Souter—insofar as their responses to the two Ten 
Commandments cases are concerned.  Though not advocates of a 
complete “wall of separation” between church and state (as described by 
Thomas Jefferson254), they are nonetheless opposed to governments’ 
endorsement of one religion over another through displays or other 
types of speech. 
E. The New Justices:  After October 2005 Term 
1. Chief Justice Roberts 
When William Rehnquist died on the night of September 3, 2005, the 
Senate was holding hearings on the nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to 
succeed Sandra Day O’Connor as an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court.255  On Monday, September 5, 2005, President George W. Bush re-
nominated Roberts to succeed William Rehnquist as Chief Justice.256  
Roberts was then a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
where he had served since 2001.257  The author of 49 opinions while on 
the D.C. Circuit, Mr. Roberts was seen as a “judicial minimalist.”258  He 
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had clerked for Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1980–1981 after his graduation 
from Harvard Law, where he had served as Managing Editor of the 
Harvard Law Review.259   
Chief Justice Roberts has sterling Republican credentials.  After 
clerking for Chief Justice Rehnquist, Roberts was hired as a special 
assistant to the U.S. Attorney General (William French Smith), and then 
as Associate Counsel to the President.260  He also served two years in the 
first Bush presidency as Deputy Solicitor General.261  Evangelical 
Christian groups greeted his nomination to the Supreme Court with 
approval.262   
While serving in the Reagan White House, Roberts was asked to 
provide an opinion on a request for President Reagan to publicly 
approve legislative efforts in Kentucky to require placement of “In God 
We Trust” plaques in public schools.263  Roberts urged the President to 
refrain from issuing such an approving message, writing that it was 
“inappropriate” for the President to interfere with Kentucky’s legislative 
processes and that “the President should not gratuitously opine on the 
constitutionality” of legislation that implicates the Establishment 
Clause.264  Anticipating his position on the Summum case, it is probably 
fair to say that he may not be much different than his predecessor, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist.  He will likely lean toward the conservative 
side of the Court by voting to uphold the City of Pleasant Grove’s right 
to limit public expression in city parks. 
2. Justice Alito 
Associate Justice Samuel Alito was sworn in as the nation’s 110th 
Supreme Court Justice on Tuesday, January 31, 2006 after being 
confirmed by a mostly party-line vote of 58 to 42.265  Justice Alito was a 
judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when President George W. 
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Bush nominated him to the Supreme Court.266  Justice Alito succeeds 
retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed to the 
Court.267  Justice Alito was confirmed by the closest vote since Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s confirmation of 52 to 48 in 1991.268   
In the Summum case, it is more than likely that Justice Alito will vote 
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts to find in favor of 
Pleasant Grove.  Jay Sekulow, representing Pleasant Grove, called Justice 
Alito’s nomination a “grand slam.”269  Justice Alito’s decisions from the 
Third Circuit on separation of church and state “fall squarely in the 
conservative camp.”270  In 1999, he wrote an opinion finding that a city-
sponsored crèche and menorah did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.271  In 2000, he authored a dissent in a case involving a 
kindergarten student at a public school, who created a poster being 
thankful for Jesus when students were asked to make posters depicting 
what they were thankful for.272  Alito chastised the majority for not 
addressing the constitutional issues raised by the case, and expounded 
his conservative views in dicta.273  He quickly declared that displaying 
the child’s poster does not raise any Establishment Clause problems 
because “[t]he Establishment Clause is not violated when the 
government treats religious speech and other speech equally and a 
reasonable observer would not view the government practice as 
endorsing religion.”274  He would hold that “discrimination based on the 
religious content of speech is viewpoint discrimination.”275   
The swing votes in the Summum case could belong to Justices 
Kennedy and Ginsburg, the only two Justices who did not write opinions 
on the so-called Twin Ten Commandments cases.  Justice Breyer may be 
a “wild card”—as he was in Van Orden.  If Justices Stevens and Souter 
stand resolute, they will need to strike common ground with Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy if they hope to garner five votes.   
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V.  THE SUMMUM, THE SEVEN APHORISMS, AND THE ROAD TO THE HIGH 
COURT 
In Van Orden, Justice Stevens presciently observed that there are 
many different versions of the Decalogue, “ascribed to by different 
religions[.]”276  The Summum, for example, believe that Moses felt the 
Israelites were not ready to receive the Seven Principles of Creation 
handed down by God to him, so he destroyed the tablets containing the 
Seven Aphorisms, traveled back to Mount Sinai, and returned with a 
second set of tablets containing the Ten Commandments.277  Therefore, 
the Seven Aphorisms and the Ten Commandments are “two different 
points of view on the same subject.”278  One of these “different” points of 
view, however, has been silenced by Pleasant Grove through its denial of 
Summum’s request to display its Seven Aphorisms next to a Ten 
Commandments display. 
Pleasant Grove is represented by the American Center for Law & 
Justice (“ACLJ”) and its Chief Counsel, Jay Sekulow.279  “Founded by 
televangelist Pat Robertson in 1990, the ACLJ has an annual budget of 
$35 million and employs about 130 people, including 37 lawyers[.]”280  
Sekulow describes himself as an aggressive litigator, driven by his own 
faith as a Brooklyn-born Jewish convert to Christianity, and a member of 
Jews for Jesus.281  After making his fortune in real estate tax shelters, he 
signed on as general counsel for Jews for Jesus, and in that role helped to 
craft the start of a revolution in First Amendment law, arguing that 
public displays of piety were protected not by the Free Exercise Clause, 
but by the Free Speech Clause.282   
In 1987, Sekulow argued that a Los Angeles city resolution banning 
leafleting by groups, including Jews for Jesus, at the Los Angeles 
International Airport violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause.283  A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice O’Connor, agreed.284  In 1990, he used the free speech argument 
again to advocate for the student’s rights to hold Bible club meetings 
after-hours on school premises, and again the Supreme Court agreed.285  
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He successfully used the same argument in a case involving the use of 
public school facilities to show Christian films and the use of public 
university funds to subsidize some student groups but not Christian-
based groups.286  In 2007, he deployed an extension of the Free Speech 
argument in successfully representing a pharmacist who refused to sell 
Plan B, an emergency contraceptive the pharmacist considered 
equivalent to abortion.287   
Summum also comes before the Court on ostensibly free speech 
grounds.  After the Court’s decision in Van Orden, an Establishment 
Clause challenge to Pleasant Grove’s policy on public displays at Pioneer 
Park was duly dismissed.288  With that obstacle removed, the City next 
turned its defense of its denial to Summum by referring to a policy called 
“Criteria for Placement,” under which it would permanently display a 
privately-donated monument if either the donated item has historical 
relevance to the community, the donor is an established Pleasant Grove 
civic organization with strong ties to the community, or has a historical 
connection with Pleasant Grove City.289  In spite of the fact that at the 
time the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated the Ten Commandments 
statue to the city in 1971 the local chapter had only existed for two 
years,290 and in spite of the fact that the Ten Commandments display 
would not be endorsed by Mormons,291 the City cites its policy for 
allowing the Fraternal Order of Eagles’s monument to stand while 
rejecting the Summum monument.  The arguments in the merit and 
amici briefs, therefore, center around issues related to government 
speech, public forums, and whether or not an outcome in favor of 
Summum will result in a Statue of Tyranny being erected next to the 
Statue of Liberty.292  Although not briefed by the parties, the Court could 
also presumably, though it would be a stretch, revive its curious 
“expressive association” doctrine, first announced in Dale, to posit that 
forcing the City to permit the Summums to erect their monument would 
violate the City’s free speech rights.293  We note simply that a win by 
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Pleasant Grove will mean that any public Ten Commandments display 
can easily withstand a First Amendment challenge, on either 
Establishment Clause or Free Speech grounds.   
The Sekulow game plan, then, is as follows.  For any city in the 
United States that wishes to display the Christian Ten Commandments 
in a public space, to the exclusion of all other religious artifacts, the goal 
is to remove the display from the realm of the Establishment Clause.  If 
Summum goes as planned and the Court finds in favor of Pleasant Grove,  
any city seeking to erect a Ten Commandments display should adopt a 
content-neutral policy that purports to consider for acceptance any 
monument, regardless of its message, as long as the speaker of the 
monument has longstanding ties to the city or community.  Under these 
criteria, the City can readily accept a Ten Commandments display, 
claiming blithely it is not the message that matters, but the speaker.  
Since the criteria for selection is content-neutral, a facial Establishment 
Clause challenge to the display will fail.  Once out of the realm of the 
Establishment Clause, the only avenue of challenge left is the public 
forum argument advanced by Summum.  Assuming a favorable outcome 
in Summum, the City needs only claim that the display, once donated to 
the City (i.e., title of ownership of the display passes to the city), and that 
the selection of the display itself (again, careful to avoid endorsing the 
contents itself) is government speech and therefore no equal access rights 
are granted to other speakers.  The end result is a Ten Commandments 
display, on public grounds, without any consideration of religious 
motivation.  If the strategy succeeds, it can easily be adapted and 
deployed to inject other religious displays into the public sphere.   
The Brief in Opposition contemplates this outcome in a footnote, 
barely daring to suggest that the City’s strategy could be that daring:  “It 
is not the purpose of the First Amendment to ensure that governmental 
entities remain free to disclaim speech as purely private when it suits 
their Establishment Clause needs while simultaneously avoiding the 
rules that generally govern the regulation of private speech.”294  The 
facts, however, seem to plainly speak for themselves.  Summum, 
described by Sekulow as the “most significant” Ten Commandments 
case in the Supreme Court’s history,295 is the logical next step in a multi-
faceted and choreographed attack on Jefferson’s Wall of Separation.  
Even more appealing for the Roberts’s Court, with its purported sense of 
“judicial modesty,” the result is achieved without overruling prior 
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Establishment Clause precedents.  Perhaps most importantly, McCreary 
will be rendered impotent without a direct assault by the Roberts 
Court.296  While this may evoke grumbling from Justice Scalia, surely 
even he would be pleased with such an outcome.   
VI.  ROUSSEAU’S “CIVIL RELIGION” AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
FOR THE SUMMUM 
A leading scholar in sociology cited Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the 
original source for the concept of a “Civil Religion.”297  In his essay on 
“The Social Contract,” Rousseau argued for a civil religion with only five 
(5) simple precepts, or dogmas if you prefer:   
1. The existence of God; 
2. The life-to-come; 
3. The reward of virtue; 
4. The punishment of vice; and 
5. The exclusion of religious intolerance.298 
Note that the Holy Bible is not on the list, and neither are Moses or 
Jesus.  However, religious intolerance is specifically excluded by 
Rousseau’s civil religion.  Also, a number of practices that concerned 
members of the Court, such as opening prayer for Congress and printing 
“In God We Trust” on our money, would come clearly within the 
umbrella of Civic Religion, as proposed by Rousseau.   
One reading of an episode in early U.S. history might support the 
idea that the Founders embraced either a civic religion or the Public 
Religion of John Adams, the second President.299  The initial request to 
open every session of the Continental Congress with prayer was refused 
until it was re-framed as a request by Sam Adams of Boston for an 
essentially non-denominational prayer by a man of good character, 
piety, and virtue.300  We have yet to make substantial inroads against 
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religious intolerance, particularly the current virulent prejudice against 
the followers of Islam.301   
Intolerance aside, one can see from Table 1.0 that Rousseau’s 
proposed “civil religion” seems to fall roughly midway between the 
“Publick Religion” of John Adams and the wall of separation endorsed 
by both Thomas Jefferson and the father of the Bill of Rights, James 
Madison.  Civil Religion also has the advantage of more closely 
paralleling the historical tracks in the relationship between State (U.S. 
style) and Church.   
Finally, we should note that the future demographics of the U.S. 
seem to point to more, rather than less, diversity.  One estimate is that 
racial and ethnic minorities will make a majority of this country’s 
population by 2042.302  This is not a good time to embrace John Adams’s 
stance that leans toward a general Protestant Christian “Publick 
Religion.”  This was a stance, historically, that dogged both Jefferson and 
Madison.  It may have historically provoked their rather extreme stance 
of separation.  If we were to speculate, Madison and Jefferson might 
have embraced the extremism of complete separation with an eye 
toward a distant compromise that might have looked like Rousseau’s 
civil religion.   
 
Table 1.0 
 Civil 
Religion 
(Rousseau) 
“Publick 
Religion” 
(John 
Adams) 
Wall of 
Separation 
(Thomas 
Jefferson) 
1.  Prayer at Inaugural & 
Opening of Congress YES YES NO 
2.  Mention “God” on 
coinage YES YES NO 
3.   “Praise to God” on 
Washington Monument YES YES NO 
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(in Latin) 
4.  Any preferment of Judeo 
– Christian tradition NO YES NO 
5.  Printing Masonic 
symbols on paper 
money 
NO YES NO 
6.  Leaving “under God” in 
the Pledge of Allegiance YES YES NO 
7.  Texas Monolith NO YES NO 
8.  Kentucky posting of 10 
Commandments in 
Courthouses 
NO YES NO 
9.  Putting Bible quotations 
up in federal buildings NO YES NO 
10.  Permitting a spirituality 
festival with all 
interested religious 
groups having exhibits 
at a state university 
YES NO NO 
11.  Putting a slogan “I 
believe,” with Christian 
cross on state license 
plate 
NO YES NO 
12.  Allowing installation of 
the Summum's Seven 
Aphorisms in City Park 
NO NO NO 
 
We believe the better-reasoned position for the Court would be to 
embrace the civil religion philosophy propounded by Rousseau and 
elaborated for the American experience by Professors Robert Bellah303 
and Henry Steele Commager.304  Such a position would reflect American 
experience and again re-assert the ultimate principle of religious 
tolerance, namely, that governments cannot prefer one religion to 
another; neither can governments prefer religion to non-religion.   
To endorse the concept of “ten” commandments is to prefer 
Christianity to Judaism and religious tradition, and to promote “The 
Decalogue” over rationalism.  To argue that Pleasant Grove’s display of 
the Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park is not 
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government endorsement of religion requires a suspension of common 
sense.  If a vandal spray-paints hate speech on the side of a business 
building, it is graffiti and vandalism.  If the business owner allows a 
reasonable time to pass without removing the hate speech, he endorses it 
implicitly and the hate speech becomes his.  Similarly, if someone places 
a yard sign on a neighbor’s property without the neighbor’s permission, 
it is trespass to property.  If the neighbor permits the sign to remain, the 
neighbor then surely accepts and endorses the sign as his own.  Even if 
the purpose of erecting a Ten Commandments statue is secular, but the 
objective result is the promotion of one religion over another by the 
government, the First Amendment is violated just as surely as if the 
intent had been otherwise.  The secular versus religious purpose is a 
chimera.  It is a red herring to obscure the movement of our government 
deeply into the area of religious speech and expression where it is 
prohibited from going.   
We conclude that there is no place in American society for a 
governmental endorsement of the so-called Ten Commandments.  They 
are a minefield of problems under the First Amendment.  Moreover, 
leading scholars agree that ethics are independent of religion.305  As for 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s and Justice Scalia’s prostrating themselves 
before the icons of “Religious Tradition” and majority religious 
sentiments respectively, there is no substantial constitutional or 
historical support for either.  Religious tradition flies in the face of 
American history and may be an attempt to resurrect John Adams’s 
public piety.  It must fail on the second front because, as Professor Witte 
noted, Adams’s public piety (dominated by a strong leaning toward a 
non-denominational Protestantism) requires a frontier as an essential 
safety valve for non-conformists and free-thinkers.  The frontier has 
disappeared.  The safety valve necessary for such public policy no longer 
exists.   
We believe that Justice Breyer’s concern about stirring religious fires 
of discontent by taking down long-standing engravings of the Ten 
Commandments might be met by “grand fathering” older public piety 
displays.  Such a prospective application of the wall of separation would, 
in time, be dominant—without any need to sandblast every public 
square in every county seat.  The grandfathering proof could be used as 
a defense to any Establishment contention, making the Summum decision 
prospective only in application.   
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VII.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Louis Brandeis once said, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.”306  We can assume that if the Summum possess 
sufficient resources to litigate matters before the Supreme Court that 
they can also utilize those resources to purchase billboards and land to 
put up their Seven Aphorisms anywhere besides Pioneer Park.  In 
reality, what they seek in their petition is equal government 
endorsement of the Seven Aphorisms and the Ten Commandments.  
This unfortunate case is the logical outcome of government-sanctioned 
religious expression.  The twin 2005 Ten Commandments Supreme 
Court decisions do not seem to be particularly helpful in getting our 
country to “come to grips”—so to speak—with the social and political 
tension between two usually well-intentioned groups, those who want 
more religion in our public life and those who want less public piety in 
our public life.  In a sense, the decisions have prolonged the debate and 
have postponed the day of reckoning.   
Governmental posting of the Decalogue in public, as we have 
demonstrated above, displays theological and Biblical ignorance, is 
chauvinistic, and—ultimately—is divisive.  A superior idea would be for 
the Supreme Court to embrace Rousseau’s limited concept of a Civil 
Religion.  Religion is alive and well in the United States; and it neither 
requires nor deserves any assistance or hindrance from the government.  
However, some respect for tradition, as well as some awareness of our 
current diversity, should support the Court to embrace Rousseau’s 
limited Civil Religion and to eschew both John Adams’s “Publick 
Religion” and Mr. Jefferson’s Wall of Separation.   
The Court’s answer in Summum, if explicit and clear enough, will 
provide guidance for lower courts as similar issues percolate.  In South 
Carolina, for example, a federal lawsuit has been filed against the state 
legislature for adding a license plate option with the words “I Believe” 
along with a Christian cross superimposed over a stained glass 
window.307  Under our adoption of a civil religion standard, if South 
Carolina decides to permit religious groups to exercise their free speech 
rights on a license plate, then that right must be afforded to all other 
religious groups on an equal basis.  This result would be in line with 
stare decisis and the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence on both free 
speech and establishment clause jurisprudence.  A contrary ruling in 
Summum, however, holding that the government has no obligation to 
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provide an equal voice to other religious organizations once it has 
adopted one particular voice as its own, would upend those decisions.  
Such an activist decision would no doubt please religious conservatives, 
but the fallout of such a decision would be that South Carolina can offer 
license plates that endorse only one religion over all others.  The 
torturous outcome would mean that under the First Amendment, free 
speech protects Christians who wish to express their Christianity on 
license plates to the exclusion of Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, atheists, and 
yes, even Summums, while the free exercise clause protects no one.   
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in a recent opinion on affirmative action 
that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”308  We observe the same may be said 
of religious discrimination:  The way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of religion is to stop discriminating on the basis of religion.  A ruling in 
favor of Pleasant Grove in Summum may deal a fatal blow to the wall of 
separation.  At the very least, it would blast open a hole through which 
government may endorse the most startling rise of public displays of 
religiosity in well over a hundred years.  A government that can endorse 
the Protestant Ten Commandments over all other religious artifacts is a 
government that can fine its citizens for not observing religious faith (a 
fine for not celebrating Christmas, perhaps?).  We urge otherwise. 
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